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COMMENT
Remedies-"Extra-Contractual" Remedies for Breach of Contract
in North Carolina
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, a number of problems, both conceptual and technical,
have made it difficult for the civil litigant to secure punitive damages
in North Carolina courts.' No litigant has faced more formidable ob-
stacles than the party suing on a breach of contract theory, seeking both
compensatory damages for the breach itself and punitive damages for
the wrongful manner in which defendant breached.2 Two recent deci-
sions of the North Carolina Supreme Court, when read together (the
first for its result, the second for its analysis), seem to increase greatly
such a plaintiff's chances of reaching the jury with a punitive damage
claim. The second decision seems to warn that the bad faith breach
of an insurance contract may result in liability for an assortment of other
special damages as well.
In Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc.,' a divided court
ruled that plaintiff's award need not be limited to compensatory dam-
ages dictated by the terms of the parties' agreement when the breach
"smack[s] of tort because of the fraud and deceit involved."4  Lan-
guage in the opinion, however, might have permitted a trial judge to
grant summary judgment against a punitive damages claim unless he
found the fraudulent conduct to be coupled with an "'element of aggra-
vation' "' that rendered the conduct "outrageous" and "asocial" as a
1. See, e.g., Van Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 261 N.C. 539, 135 S.E.2d
640 (1964); Lutz Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333
(1955); Baker v. Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 113 S.E. 570 (1922); Holmes v. Carolina Cent.
R.R., 94 N.C. 318 (1886); 3 J. STRONG, NORTH CAROLINA INDEX, Damages § 11, at 181
(2d ed. 1967). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CoNmTACrs § 1077 (1964 & Supp. 1971).
2. See, e.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); King v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 159 S.E.2d 891 (1968); Davis v. North Carolina
State Highway Comm'n, 271 N.C. 405, 156 S.E.2d 685 (1967); Nunn v. Smith, 270
N.C. 374, 154 S.E.2d 497 (1967); Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d
785 (1953); see Note, Recovery of Punitive Damages for Fraud and Deceit, 31 N.C.L.
REv. 473 (1953).
3. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
4. Id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 809.
5. Id. at 134, 225 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236
N.C. 723, 725, 73 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1953)).
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matter of law. 6  Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co.7 clarified the
Oestreicher holding, dispensing with the "aggravation" requirement in
cases where the trial judge determines actionable fraud.8 The more
recent case went further and suggested that a fraudulent breach of con-
tract may not be the only breach for which "extra-contractual" damages
can be awarded.' The majority opinion in Newton seemed to say that
the bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay a valid claim might itself give
rise to a cause of action in tort.10 The question of what remedial con-
sequences would flow from such a characterization was not clearly
answered.
Oestreicher involved a commercial lease agreement, seemingly
arm's length, between two business entities,'1 whereby defendant
leased from plaintiff'2 a store building in which defendant conducted
a retail furniture business. 13  The lease provided that defendant was
to pay a minimum rent plus five percent of its net sales income above
a stated amount.' 4 In 1974, thirteen years after the signing of the
initial agreement, Oestreicher sued, alleging that for a period of nine
years American National Stores, Inc. had misrepresented its net sales
so that Oestreicher had been deprived of $11,233.20 due under the
lease. 15 The complaint stated a cause of action for breach of con-
tract-with the fraudulent reporting of sales as the breach itself-and
a separate cause of action reiterating the fraudulent conduct and asking
for punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.16
The superior court granted summary judgment for defendant on
the second cause of action;17 the North Carolina Court of Appeals dis-
6. Id.
7. 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
8. id. at 113-14, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
9. Id. at 115-16, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
10. Id. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
11. 290 N.C. at 120, 225 S.E.2d at 799; Complaint at 2-5, 27 N.C. App. 330, 219
S.E.2d 303 (1975). Oestreicher-Winner was a family-owned retail clothing business at
the time the lease was made. The lease included an agreement by lessee not to compete
with the Oestricher-Winner line of business. 290 N.C. at 140, 225 S.E.2d at 810.
12. Plaintiff was Mrs. Bert Oestreicher, suing in her capacity as trustee for two
other members of the family. 290 N.C. at 118, 225 S.E.2d at 797.
13. American National Stores, Inc. became a successor lessee in 1970. Earlier,
American National had done business as Johnston's L & S Furniture Co. in whose name
the original lease was signed. In 1970 the lease was renewed for a five-year period.
Id. at 120, 225 S.E.2d at 799-800.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 132-33, 225 S.E.2d at 806-07.
16. Id. at 131-32, 225 S.E.2d at 806; Complaint at 2-5, 27 N.C. App. 330, 219
S.E.2d 303 (1975).
17. 290 N.C. at 121, 225 S.E.2d at 800.
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missed Oestreicher's appeal as improperly interlocutory because the
judgment was final as to only one of two claims. 8 On discretionary
review, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the breach of con-
tract cause and the punitive damages claim had been improperly
severed." Reviewing exceptions to the general rules against punitive
damages awards for breach of contract or for fraud, the court by
a four-to-three vote ordered the question of punitive damages returned
to the jury. The grant of summary judgment, the majority wrote, had
overlooked the fact that although this was a "type of contract case,"
there were "substantial tort overtones emanating from the fraud and
deceit."20
No fraud was alleged in Newton. Plaintiff owned a retail business
for which he had purchased theft insurance coverage from defendant.
Plaintiff filed a claim for $5,000 under the policy for losses suffered
in a burglary of his premises. Defendant refused payment.21  In his
complaint, plaintiff alleged: (1) that defendant had refused "to properly
settle" the claim;22 (2) that the future of his business was threatened
by his inability to collect his due benefits; (3) that although he had
communicated to defendant this "desperate need,' 23 the insurer had
continued in his refusal to comply with the terms of the insurance con-
18. 27 N.C. App. 330, 330, 219 S.E.2d 303, 304 (1975).
19. The court of appeals had held that because the judgment contained no deter-
mination from the trial judge that "there is no just reason for delay" in hearing the ap-
peal, it was not final and appealable under their reading of N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b). Id.
On discretionary review, the supreme court decided to hear the interlocutory appeal be-
cause its outcome "affects a substantial right." 290 N.C. at 124, 130, 225 S.E.2d at
802, 805. The procedural stance is significant in its relation to the substance of the
decision. The supreme court refused to allow the punitive damages or "tort" cause of
action to be severed from the breach of contract cause of action. The "substantial right"
of the plaintiff to have both causes heard before the same judge and jury is the reason
that the supreme court gave for hearing the interlocutory appeal. The court said, re-
garding this first error on appeal, "The causes of action that the plaintiff alleges are
related to each other. He seeks punitive damages in the second cause because of the
alleged misconduct of defendant in the first cause of action." Id. at 130, 225 S.E.2d
at 805. This holding is an indication that North Carolina has relaxed to some extent
its requirement of a showing of an "independent tort" by the plaintiff seeking punitive
damages for breach of contract. If the breach claim and the punitive damages claim
are merged, the jury has been given more freedom to consider the culpability of the
breach itself, as a breach of contract and not as a tort. See text accompanying notes
98 & 105 infra.
20. 290 N.C. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 809.
21. 291 N.C. at 109, 229 S.E.2d at 300. Plaintiff also filed a claim for losses
caused by a fire that occurred on the premises shortly after the burglary. In his brief
before the court of appea.s, Newton alleged that the insurance company had not paid
this fire loss claim in a timely manner. Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 2, 27 N.C. App.
168, 218 S.E.2d 232 (1975).
22. 291 N.C. at 110, 229 S.E.2d at 300.
23. Id.
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tract; and (4) that defendant's conduct was "heedless, wanton and op-
pressive."" Plaintiff sought $5,500 in compensatory damages and
$50,000 in punitive damages for the oppression involved in the
breach25
The trial court struck the claim for punitive damages from the
complaint on the stated ground that North Carolina law did not permit
punitive damages for a breach of contract claim.26  As in Oestreicher,
the court of appeals held that the decision of the trial court was not
appealable, because the dismissal of the punitive damages claim did not
represent a final judgment.27 Implicit in this decision was the finding that
such a dismissal did not "affect a 'substantial right.' ",28 Again, the
supreme court reversed, ruling that the party complaining of a breach
of contract did have a "substantial right" to have the punitive damages
issue heard by the same court that considered the breach.2
Before the supreme court, plaintiff urged that defendant's oppres-
sive conduct amounted to a tort for which punitive damages could be
awarded.30 The majority agreed that defendant would have been
liable for punitive damages if its dealings with plaintiff had been
fraudulent.3" The majority added that punitive damages might also
have been in order if the insurer had refused to investigate plaintiff's
claim or if the insurer, after investigation, had determined the claim
to be valid but still refused to pay and if either refusal had been made
with the intention of causing further damage to plaintiff.3 2 Finding
none of these circumstances, the court affirmed the dismissal. On the
way to denying the particular plaintiff's punitive damages, however,
Justice Exum's opinion for the court answered a number of questions
left open by Oestreicher and seemed to expand the remedial possibili-
ties for breach of contract, at least when the breach is of an insurance
contract.
Chief Justice Sharp dissented emphatically in Oestreicher and,
while concurring in their result, decried the thinking of the Newton
majority. In the first case, she insisted: (1) that Oestreicher's only
rights were those under the contract so that any recovery beyond the
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Record at 6, 27 N.C. App. 168, 218 S.E.2d 232 (1975).
27. 27 N.C. App. 168, 169-70, 218 S.E.2d 231, 232 (1975).
28. 291 N.C. at 109, 229 S.E.2d at 300.
29. Id.
30. Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 3, 27 N.C. App. 168, 218 S.E.2d 232 (1975).
31. 291 N.C. at 114, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
32. Id. at 115-16, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
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obligations bargained for would unjustly enrich plaintiff;3 3 (2) that if
Oestreicher had a cause of action in tort for fraud, plaintiff had failed
to plead it with sufficient particularity to distinguish it from the breach
of contract claim;34 and (3) that even a showing of actionable fraud
would not merit jury consideration of punitive damages unless actual
malice, oppression, willful wrong, insult or the like were shown.35 Ac-
cording to the Chief Justice, the Newton majority's careful retracing
of the steps taken in Oestreicher served only to "further confuse an
area of the law which is rapidly becoming confusion worse con-
founded.'36
II. BACKGROUND
The conflict between the two majority opinions and those of Chief
Justice Sharp contained the outlines of the doctrinal difficulty en-
countered by almost all courts that have considered the question of
punitive damages for a cause of action that is based on contract theory
but that alleges fraud, or other intentionally wrongful conduct, as well.37
33. 290 N.C. at 146, 225 S.E.2d at 814 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part).
34. Id. at 148, 225 S.E.2d at 815. Chief Justice Sharp sought to distinguish the
deceptive conduct of the defendant from "a factual situation in which it is alleged that
a party was induced to enter into a contract by reason of a false and fraudulent repre-
sentation." Id. at 147, 225 S.E.2d at 815. Arguably, a distinction can be made between
false representations which induce the making of a contract ("fraud in the inducement")
and false representations made in the course of performance of the contractual duties
themselves ("fraud in the performance"). As long as the contract remains partially ex-
ecutory, however, and one party continues to perform in reliance upon the other's mis-
representation of facts, this inducement/performance distinction blurs considerably. In
Oestreicher, for example, plaintiff relied to her detriment upon the false representations
of defendant. She continued to perform in reliance upon the misrepresented fact that
defendant was accurately reporting its income. In this sense, plaintiff was "induced to
enter" into continuing performance by defendant's fraud.
The distinction is perhaps understood better as a graduated scale-with "tort" at
one end and "contract" at the other-than as a simple dichotomy. Fraud in the induce-
ment of a contractual agreement is distinct in time from the breach of duties under that
agreement, so such fraud can be more easily regarded as the breach of a generalized
duty. That is, as a tort. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 64 (1943). The more misrepresentations
become entangled with the failure to perform contractual obligations, the greater the dif-
ficulty in viewing the fraudulent conduct apart from the contract. Often, as in
Oestreicher, the fraudulent conduct will be the breach. See text accompanying note 85
infra.
To the extent that the inducement/performance distinction can be made, this com-
ment is limited to a consideration of fraud in the performance of contractual duties.
Anything that can be said regarding an award of puntive damages for fraud in the per-
formance will apply a fortiori to fraud in the inducement.
35. 290 N.C. at 148, 225 S.E.2d at 815.
36. 291 N.C. at 116, 299 S.E.2d at 304 (Sharp, C.J., concurring in result).
37. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 120 (1966); Annot., 165 A.L.R. 614 (1946) (ex-
8mines fraudulent breach of contract in terms of tort); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1345 (1933)
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The majority in Oestreicher justified the possibility of punitive damages
on the basis of "substantial tort overtones"3 8 in the pleaded facts; the
Chief Justice tailored her argument rejecting punitive damages to a
frame of contract theory. In past North Carolina decisions, a court's
determination of whether a complaint sounded in tort or in contract has
been critical to the question of punitive damages .3  The purpose of
punitive or exemplary damages is to punish intentionally wrongful con-
duct and thus, by example, to discourage the culpable state of mind
behind the conduct.40  Under this rationale, negligent behavior never
warrants punitive damages unless somehow "wanton." Even inten-
tional wrongdoing sometimes must be shown to have been aggravated
before a court will allow them.
41
The idea of awarding punitive damages in any civil action has
jarred some judicial sensibilities.4 s The plaintiff who receives punitive
(considers problem from perspective of contract theory); Note, Damages-Punitive
Damages for Breach of Contract, 11 N.C.L. REv. 160 (1933). The complexity of the
question is well illustrated by a string of South Carolina cases cited at 25 C.J.S., supra,
at § 120, at 1129 nn.92-95. South Carolina seems to have moved further than most
jurisdictions in the direction of allowing an award of punitive damages in the breach-
cum-fraud situation. The South Carolina developments were given extensive treatment
in Note, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 444
(1958). The Indiana Supreme Court also has explored the question in some depth.
See Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND.
L. REv. 668 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages].
38. 290 N.C. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 809.
39. Discussion in J. STRONG, supra note 1 provides an illustration of the importance
of classification. The sections of that work dealing with damages for breach of contract
make no mention whatever of punitive damages. 3 J. STRONG, supra note 1, Contracts
§§ 28.2-29.3 (3d ed. 1976). The punitive damages section, on the other hand, discusses
Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953), which is classified
as an action based on the intentional tort of fraud, and Lutz Indus. v. Dixie Home
Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955), which is placed in the "negligence" cate-
gory, again a tort. The index fails to note that in both of these actions contractual rela-
tions existed between the parties. See 3 J. STRONG, supra note 1, Damages § 11.
40. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970); Note, Exemplary Damages in the
Law of Torts, 70 Hv. L. REv. 517, 519 (1957); Punitive Damages, supra note 37,
at 669. It is the punishment aspect of punitive or exemplary damages that results in
their being called "smart money" in an occasional older case. See, e.g., Cotton v. Fish-
eries Prod. Co., 181 N.C. 151, 152, 106 S.E. 487, 488 (1921).
Professor Clarence Morris distinguishes between the "reparative" and "admonitory"
aspects of all tort damages. He points out that any damages award, except one given
under a "strict liability" or "liability without fault" theory, is intended to admonish what
may even be only a negligent "wrongdoer" as well as to restore the plaintiff's economic
security. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HAgv. L. REv. 1173, 1174
(1931).
41. See D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDiES § 3.9, at 205-06 (1973);
Punitive Damages, supra note 37, at 669.
42. "[A] monstrous heresy. . . . [Ain unhealthy execresence, deforming the
symmetry of the body of the law." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873). "The
submission of the issue of punitive damages furnishes an opportunity for the exerciso
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damages from the jury has been made more than whole; he has made
a "profit" on his injury beyond recovery for his losses, even beyond
compensation for such remote losses as pain and suffering and mental
anguish, although at the outer edges of recovery these distinctions blur.
The defendant, in the meantime, has been punished, and punishment,
in theory, is reserved for the criminal law. A party defending his con-
duct against the imposition of punitive damages in a civil action is
denied a number of the procedural safeguards guaranteed to the
criminal defendant.43
The pleader in tort theory, however, has at least complained of
a "wrong," a violation of a duty imposed by law rather than by a private
agreement, so that a stronger rationale can be advanced for punishing
the tortfeasor beyond the extent of the actual damage he has caused
than for similarly punishing the contract breacher 4 Conceptually, the
tortfeasor has imposed a wrong upon a stranger; the parties to a contract
have bargained for and balanced their several duties.45  To extract pay-
ment from defendant on behalf of plaintiff beyond the duty undertaken
by defendant is to "rewrite the contract for the parties," which the courts
profess themselves unable to do.
of passion and prejudice upon the part of a jury, resulting in an unjust award ....
Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 442, 66 N.E.2d 224, 236 (1946) (Hart, J.,
dissenting).
43. In a criminal trial, a defendant cannot be made to testify against himself; the
standard by which his guilt or innocence is determined is "guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt"; the jury does not assess the penalty; the prohibition against "double jeopardy"
insures that there will not be double punishment. In a civil trial for punitive damages,
the defendant must testify when called to the stand by the plaintiff; the standard is "pre-
ponderance of the evidence"; the amount of the punitive damages is set by the jury sub-
ject to some control by the court; there is the possibility that the defendant, if his con-
duct has also violated criminal law, will be punished twice for the same conduct. Saber-
ton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 432, 66 N.E.2d 224, 232 (1946) (Hart, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Hart also points out that any fines levied for conduct deemed a transgres-
sion of the public interest-i.e., a crime-are given over to the public, while civil punitive
damages "enrich" only the plaintiff. Id. See also Punitive Damages, supra note 37.
But see Morris, supra note 40, at 1182-83.
44. There can be no doubt that the general purpose underlying the law of
damages, whether they are given for a breach of contract or for a tort, is to
promote security and to prevent disorder. . . . Breaches of contract, however,
do not in general cause as much resentment or other mental and physical dis-
comfort as do the wrongs called torts and crimes. . . . It has been found suf-
ficient to give pecuniary compensation to the injured party with no necessity
for satisfying his feelings and allaying community resentment by fines or phy-
sical punishment.
A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1077.
45. The measure of damages for breach of contract is the amount which will
compensate the injured party for the loss which fulfillment of the promise
could have prevented or the breach of it entailed, so that the parties may be
placed as nearly as may be in the same monetary condition that they would
have occupied had the contract not been breached.
3 J. STRONG, supra note 1, Contracts § 29.2, at 442 (3d ed. 1976).
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The most loudly voiced criticism of awarding punitive damages in
a civil action has been directed at the "passion and prejudice . . . [of
the] jury."'' 0 Not only punitive damages but special damages in gen-
eral are less accessible to the pleader in contract than to the plaintiff
who is blessed with a tort cause of action. The disparity results
from uncoordinated notions of "forseeability. '4 7  The defendant to a
tort claim is generally held to have "forseen" much farther than the
party who has spelled out his foresight in a contract. 48  A jury is
allowed to look only as far as the parties have "forseen." Beyond that,
the jury's views are "conjectural." The parties to a contract have
undertaken to measure their expectations of each other, so that the
awarding of damages when breach of contract has been found can pro-
ceed against some objective (non-"conjectural") standard. In a tort ac-
tion it is more difficult to measure "forseeability" and, therefore, to limit
the jury's freedom to set whatever damages are deemed appropriate-
general, special or even punitive. Punitive damages are never bar-
gained for, never foreseen. To allow the jury to consider and allocate
risks which the parties themselves, despite the opportunity to do so,
have not allocated is to permit the jury to speculate and conjecture.
The further the jury proceeds beyond the easily quantifiable (i.e., dam-
ages that "compensate" according to the terms agreed upon beforehand
by the parties) the more it approaches the realm of "passion and
prejudice." 49 This is the theory.
46. Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 442, 66 N.E.2d 224, 236 (1946)
(Hart, J., dissenting). See also Morris, supra note 40, at 1178; Note, supra note 40,
at 530; Punitive Damages, supra note 37, at 670.
47. D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 12.3, at 812.
48. Id. at 804; see Koufos v. Czarnikow, Ltd. (The Heron II), (1969] 1 A.C.
350. See generally Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). Any general
discussion of Hadley is beyond the scope of this comment. It may be useful, however,
to consider the treatment of Hadley by Lord Reid in Koufos, "The modem rule in tort
is quite different [from the rule in contract] and it imposes a much wider liability ...
I have no doubt that today a tortfeasor would be held liable for a type of damage
as unlikely as was the stoppage of Hadley's Mill for lack of a crank shaft. . . . But
it does not at all follow that Hadley v. Baxendale would today be differently decided."
[1969] 1 A.C. at 385-86 (footnote omitted).
49. A 1930 North Carolina Law Review article examined the reason for this re-
luctance to permit the jury to second guess the bargaining parties:
a belief that since the vast majority of breaches of contract are due to inability
or to erroneous belief as to the scope of the obligation, it is of doubtful wis-
dom to add to the risks imposed on entering into a contract, this liability to
an acrimonious contest over whether a breach was malicious or fraudulent, and
the danger of a large and undefined recovery of punitive damages.
McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Damages, 8 N.C.L. Rav. 129.
140 (1930).
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If the principle of punitive damages is the curbing of a culpable
mind, it is difficult to understand why such damages should be any less
available for an intentionally wrongful breach of contract than for a
tort.5" Possibly the vocabulary-"forseeability," "contemplation of the
parties," "contract," "tort"-obscures a more real concern: the ability
to monitor jury discretion. 5 By classifying an action as one ex
contractu, a court is able to justify foreclosing punitive damages. In
any case, the courts have evolved a rubric: "Punitive damages are not
awarded for breach of contract."52
When the actions of the breaching party reach a certain level of
reprehensibility, however, courts have characterized the behavior as "a
tort" or "tortious" and, in that way, have saved the plaintiff's punitive
damages from summary judgment.53  In those cases, the court has
placed to one side the contract theory implications in the pleading and
culled from the facts pleaded "some intentional wrong, insult, abuse,
or gross negligence which amounts to an independent tort."54  That
is, if the breaching behavior evidenced a "bad" enough state of mind,
the pleading could achieve enough momentum to escape the pull of
contract theory. On the other hand, findings even of a "malicious or
oppressive breach of contract" have been insufficient to support an
award of punitive damages when the court declined to characterize the
defendant's conduct as an "independent tort."55
The criterion that emerged from these cases, the factor that
rendered conduct culpable enough to achieve "independence" from the
50. See D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.9, at 207.
51. See generally id. § 12.3, at 814.
52. Ostreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 119, 133, 225 S.E.2d 797,
807 (1976); King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 398, 159 S.E.2d 891,
893 (1968); see 25 C.J.S. Damages § 120 (1966); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1345 (1933).
This flat prohibition was subject to exceptions for breaches of contracts to marry and
for breaches by some public conveyances and utilities. The latter breach is commonly
characterized as a breach of a tort duty to the public. At least one authority has said
that a breach of a contract to marry is also more of a tort than a "pure" breach of
contract. D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 12.4, at 818; see note 129 infra.
53. Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894
(1943); Woody v. First Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927); Carmichael
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619 (1911); Ammons v. Rail-
road, 140 N.C. 196, 52 S.E. 731 (1905); Richardson v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 126
N.C. 100, 35 S.E. 235 (1900); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 120, at 1128-29 nn.86.5-90 (1966).
But see Williams v. Carolina & N.W.R.R., 144 N.C. 498, 57 S.E. 216 (1907).
54. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 135, 225 S.E.2d 797,
808 (1976) (quoting 25,C.J.S. Damages § 120, at 1129 (1966)).
55. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301
(1976); see Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 734, 73 S.E.2d 785, 789
(1953); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 120 (1966).
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contract action and thereby warrant admonition, was "an element of
aggravation accompanying the tortious conduct which causes the
injury." 6  Conduct tortious in nature but lacking aggravating circum-
stances would be found to be "dependent" upon and absorbed back
into the breach of contract allegation." Although often vague and gen-
eral in their discussion, courts seemed to agree that aggravation would
be found "when the wrong is done willfully and maliciously or under
circumstances of rudeness or oppression, or in a manner which evinces
a reckless and wanton disregard for the plaintiff's rights."' 8 At the
heart of the "aggravation" lay the defendant's intent to do wrong or,
more frequently, his "spite," 9 "ill-will," 60 "malice," 6' 1 or, sometimes,
"recklessness." '62
Yet the party gained nothing by virtue of his contract rights: the
"element of aggravation"-in North Carolina and elsewhere-was the
same standard applied for punitive damages in any tort case. It
seemed redundant to say that punitive damages could be awarded for
breach of contract accompanied by a tort that was aggravated by malice,
when the aggravated tortious conduct alone would qualify for punish-
ment. Indeed, the tort pleader was more likely to be handicapped by
his contract rights and would have to waive them if he had decided
that the prospect of punitive damages made it worth his while to
proceed in tort.
The breach + tort + aggravation analysis can be found in North
Carolina decisions as early as 1891. In Purcell v. Richmond &
Danville Railroad Co.,6" a plaintiff ticket holder left standing beside
56. Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 725, 73 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1953);
cf. Baker v. Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 5, 113 S.E. 570, 573 (1922) ("aggravation" language
in case involving punitive damages but no contract). See also Carmichael v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 26, 72 S.E. 619, 621 (1911) ("some features of
aggravation"); Ammons v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 196, 197, 52 S.E. 731, 732 (1905) ("cir-
cumstances of aggravation"); Holmes v. Carolina Cent. R.R., 94 N.C. 318, 323 (1886)
("causes of aggravation").
57. Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 191 N.C. 182, 131 S.E. 633 (1926).
58. Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 26, 72 S.E. 619,
621 (1911).
59. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 517
(1957).
60. Id.; see Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 424, 66 N.E.2d 224, 229
(1946) ("insult"); C. McCoRMICr, LAw OF DAMAGES, § 79, at 280 (1935) ("evil").
61. Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 17, 21, 72 S.E. 619,
622 (1911); Ammons v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 196, 200, 52 S.E. 731, 733 (1905) (Hoke,
J., concurring).
62. Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 516, 23 S.E.2d
894, 896 (1943).
63. 108 N.C. 414, 12 S.E. 954 (1891).
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the tracks when defendant railroad failed to stop at his station was told
by the North Carolina Supreme Court that he had a cause of action
in tort for breach of a public duty, even though the tortious conduct
also constituted a breach of contract. Further, it was held that if
defendant's conduct were shown to be "willful or . . . such gross negli-
gence as to indicate a wanton disregard for the rights of the plaintiff,"64
the railroad would be liable for punitive damages. If the harm to plain-
tiff resulted from simple negligence, the court said, plaintiff's recovery
would be limited to the fifteen cents he had paid for the ticket and
the twenty-five cents paid for other transportation-basic contract
remedies.65 The same analysis produced similar results in a number
of other early common carrier and public utility cases.66 In a 1943
case, the supreme court decided that a plaintiff had suffered a trespass
when the company that had sold him an automobile under an install-
ment contract breached that contract by repossessing the car "wrong-
fully" and in such a manner "that the plaintiff was humiliated in a pub-
lic place."6 7  Despite the contractual context, an award of punitive
damages was upheld.
In contrast, the court has overturned a jury assessment of punitive
damages against a defendant railroad whose conductor had required
plaintiff passenger to leave the first class car for which he had pur-
chased a ticket and ride in inferior accommodations.68 The court noted
the "aggravation" standard69 and, finding "no evidence either of rude-
ness or unnecessary force, '70 limited plaintiffs recovery to compensa-
tory damages, presumably determined under the terms of the contract
for passage. 71 In a 1926 case not involving the special tort duty im-
posed on public conveyances, a plaintiff suing his former employer on
a tort theory for "false, wilful and malicious"72 charges made against
64. Id. at 418, 12 S.E. at 955.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E.
619 (1911) (telephone company); Ammons v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 196, 52 S.E. 731
(1905) (railroad); Hutchinson v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 123, 52 S.E. 263 (1905) (rail-
road). The North Carolina Supreme Court has implied a special tort duty owed by
a bank to its customers. Woody v. First Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150
(1927).
67. Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 515, 23 S.E.2d
894, 896 (1943).
68. Holmes v. Carolina Cent. R.R., 94 N.C. 318 (1886).
69. Id. at 323.
70. Id. at 324.
71. Id.
72. Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 191 N.C. 182, 183, 131 S.E. 633, 634
(1926).
1977] 1135
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
him at the time of his allegedly improper discharge from employment
was told by the North Carolina Supreme Court that his only rights were
those under his employment contract with defendant. 7a The court re-
fused to designate the alleged slander as the "independent tort" that
would revive plaintiff's chance for punitive damages, although the court
did recognize that possibility.74 The implication in these cases was that
the conduct of the breaching party might have been tortious but was
not tortious enough to be "independent" of the contract claim.
III. FRAUD
In North Carolina, as elsewhere, a breach together with unaggra-
vated tortious conduct had no cumulative effect.7I The assessment of
punitive damages in the contract cases proceeded under the same tort
+ aggravation - punitive damages equation that would have been de-
terminative if the tortious conduct had been alleged alone without men-
tion of a breach of contract. In a number of North Carolina decisions,
"fraud" has been listed among the possible "elements of aggravation." 7"
But since fraudulent conduct is, or can be, a tort itself, these cases sug-
gest that fraudulent conduct would have to be coupled with a further
"element of aggravation" to support a claim for punitive damages.
This analysis, however, assumes that the intent to deceive that is an
essential element of the fraud cause of action is not itself "aggravating."
The aspect of intentional wrongdoing that punitive damages are meant
to deter seems implicit in fraudulent or deceitful conduct. In this way
fraud differs from other torts.77
Nevertheless, the 1953 North Carolina Supreme Court decision,
Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 8 erased a jury grant of punitive damages
for what was conceded to be "actionable fraud" when the court ruled
that "there must be an element of aggravation accompanying the
73. Id. at 188, 131 S.E. at 636.
74. Id. at 186, 131 S.E. at 635.
75. Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953); 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 120, at 1128 (1966); Note, supra note 2; cf. King v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 159 S.E.2d 891 (1968) (Plaintiff alleged fraud. The supreme
court affirmed grant of motion to strike tort claims and limited plaintiff to remedies
under the contract.). See note 148 infra.
76. Harris v. Queen City Coach Co., 220 N.C. 67, 69, 16 S.E.2d 464, 466 (1941);
Robinson v. McAlhaney, 214 N.C. 180, 184, 198 S.E. 647, 650 (1938); Tripp v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 193 N.C. 614, 616, 137 S.E. 871, 872 (1927); Holmes v. Carolina
Cent. R.R., 94 N.C. 318, 323 (1886); Note, supra note 2, at 474.
77. Note, supra note 2, at 475.
78. 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953).
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tortious conduct which causes the injury . . . . Here fraud is not an
accompanying element of an independent tort but the particular tort
alleged. ' 79 Swinton involved a fraudulent sale of land. The plaintiffs,
"aged Negroes without education,' 80 had paid $2,000 for a piece of
land that the seller had represented to be of certain dimensions.
After paying on the contract for three years and finally receiving a
deed, plaintiffs learned that the property deeded them by the realty
was one-tenth the size of the plot described to them at the time they
contracted to purchase.8' The court ignored the possibility that de-
fendant's proven intent to deceive the buyers in a situation of widely
unbalanced bargaining power might have evidenced the exact mental
state for which punitive damages were designed. Fraud was a tort,
the court reasoned and punitive damages were awarded for the com-
mission of a tort only when that tort was aggravated. 81 It made no
apparent difference that the seller's conduct in violating a tort duty
against fraud had also violated plaintiffs' contract rights. The net result
of Swinton was that three elements must be presented in the complaint
of fraudulent breach if the question of punitive damages is to go to
the jury: breach + fraud (as the accompanying tort) ± aggravation.
Although the Swinton court gave only perfunctory attention to
contract theory, at least one later decision has cited the case for the
familiar proposition that "punitive damages are not given for breach
of contract."8" Several other North Carolina Supreme Court opinions
have found in Swinton a new rubric: "[O]rdinarily punitive damages
are not recoverable in an action for fraud."84  The overlap of the two
meanings ascribed to Swinton points to the doctrinal kinship between
the action for breach of contract and that for fraud,8 5 a link that the
North Carolina courts seemed to ignore prior to Oestreicher. The mis-
representation by defendant in Swinton was "tortious conduct" but it
was also the breach of contract itself. The final remedy, after punitive
79. Id. at 725, 73 S.E.2d at 786.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 724, 73 S.E.2d at 786.
82. Id. at 726-27, 73 S.E.2d at 787-88.
83. King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 398, 159 S.E.2d 891, 893
(1968).
84. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 306, 218 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1975); Davis v.
North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 271 N.C. 405, 409, 156 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1967)
(Sharp, J.); 3 J. STRONG, supra note 1, Damages § 11, at 181.
85. It is worth noting here that the action for breach of contract has its origins
in tort theory in the action for fraud or deceit. "[Tirespass on the case in assumpsit
was made available by asserting that a breach of promise was similar to a deceit."
2 A. CoxinN, supra note 1, § 429, at 472.
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damages had been stricken, was contractual-the difference between
the market value of the land that was promised and the market value
of the land actually conveyed. The opinion noted that plaintiffs had
"been made whole" within the terms of the sales contract.8 6
In Swinton two very similar prohibitions converged; underlying
that convergence was the thought that the victim of a misrepresentation
(like the victim of a broken contractual promise) should have restored
to him any amount he has lost by his reliance on the representation
(as by reliance on the promise), but that he should not be "enriched"
by any damages beyond those "forseen" in the representation. Nor
should a jury be given free rein to speculate on the amount of damages
when it has at hand an objective standard: the value defendant's repre-
sentation would have had had he spoken truthfully.s7 While Swinton
was a step removed from the language of the contract/tort forms of
action analysis, the doctrinal underpinnings of that analysis remained.
The court now distinguished "simple" and "aggravated" fraud as sum-
marily as it had assigned certain claims to contract theory and others
to tort. The effect was the same. Just as tortious conduct found by
the court to be "dependent" was absorbed back into the contract breach
allegation, the "simpler" a fraud became the more it resembled only
the breach of a contractual promise.
"Simple fraud," then, was almost a synonym for "breach of
contract" as a catch phrase for courts to employ in withdrawing a plea
for punitive damages beyond the reach of the jury. The problem was
to distinguish between fraud that evidenced a culpable mind and for
which punitive damages should be permitted and conduct that was so
close to a mere broken promise that compensation was remedy
enough. 8  What was the promisor's intent at the time he made his
promise? Did the promisor mean what he said when he said it? If
he intended not to honor his promise, what resulting harm did he
intend, or recklessly ignore? Given these shadings of intent, the dis-
tinction between "aggravated" and "simple" fraud seems realistic and
useful only as a device with which the trial judge could remove in-
86. 236 N.C. at 726, 73 S.E.2d at 788.
87. See Note, supra note 2, at 477.
88. Certainly, it is a different thing to breach a promise than to commit fraud.
A promise predicts future conduct. Fraud is a misrepresentation relating to some past
or present fact. In a given contract, however, promises and representations often blend
inextricably. A promise made with no intention of its future performance could be
regarded as the misrepresentation of a presently existing fact. See Reed v. Cooke, 331
Mo. 507, 514-15, 55 S.W.2d 275, 278 (1932). The intention of the party at the time
he made the promise would be a question for the jury.
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volved questions from the jury. In Swinton, the real question was not
the culpability of the defendant. Everyone-two juries, the trial judge
and the North Carolina Supreme Court-agreed that the real estate
salesman was guilty of reprehensible conduct.8 9 Rather, it was the ex-
tent to which juries should be permitted to look behind the breach and
directly at the breaching behavior. The Swinton court did not even
wish to entertain the possibility.
Oestreicher and Newton can be measured by their respective
treatments of Swinton. In Oestreicher, although plaintiff's punitive
damages claim was restored, a result inconsistent with the result in
Swinton, the majority was deferential toward the earlier case. In
Newton, where no issue of fraud was before the court, the majority
opinion "overruled" Swinton.
The question in Oestreicher was whether the continuing falsifica-
tion of income figures upon which a term of the contract was based
was such a breach as could safely be assessed by a jury for possible
damages beyond payment of the unreported funds. That is, whether
defendant's fraudulent conduct alone demonstrated sufficient "bad
motive" or would require a showing of additional aggravation. Char-
acterizing Oestreicher's plea as one seeking "damages for fraud arising
from a contract arrangement,"' 0 the majority considered the rules
against punitive damages both for breach of contract and for fraud.
The first segment of the majority's analysis attempted to reconcile
punitive damages with contract theory. The majority struggled to find
in Swinton the rule that punitive damages may be considered when a
contract breach is "'attended by some intentional wrong, insult, abuse,
or gross negligence which amounts to an independent tort.'"91 Per-
haps to shore up what had only been dictum in Swinton, the majority
turned to an Ohio decision that the Swinton court had considered in
setting out its standards for punitive damages. In Saberton v. Green-
wald,92 the Ohio Supreme Court had found in a breach of contract
pleading a viable tort claim based on the fraudulent sale of a watch.
A lower court had limited plaintiff buyer's remedy to the cost of the
watch. Following the "independent tort" doctrine, the Ohio Supreme
Court had held this limitation erroneous and had remanded for a jury's
89. 236 N.C. at 727, 73 S.E.2d at 788.
90. 290 N.C. at 133, 225 S.E.2d at 807.
91. Id. at 135, 225 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages § 120, at 1128-
29 (1966)).
92. 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946).
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consideration of punitive damages.93 The Oestreicher majority made
note of the theory under which the Ohio court had preserved plaintiff's
punitive damages and then read Swinton to "adopt . . . [this] general
philosophy. . . by the. . . language: . . . 'fraudulent representations
alleged . . . accompanied by . . . outrageous conduct.' ", That is,
Oestreicher determined that in Swinton North Carolina had adopted the
breach + "independent tort" test.
In the second segment of analysis, the court considered whether
the falsification of records by American National Stores constituted such
a tort. The question then was whether the court would require further
aggravation or hold, contrary to Swinton, that "simple" (but, by defini-
tion, intentional) fraud was itself "aggravation" enough to gain "inde-
pendence" of the contract claim for the purpose of punitive damages.
Was the mental state of the "simple" fraudfeasor a fit subject for the
jury's consideration?
The court set up its answer by asserting: "In cases involving
fraud, our Court has consistently used language such as the following:
'Punitive damages are never awarded, except in cases where there is
an element either of fraud, malice, . . . or other causes of aggravation
in the act or omission causing the injury.' "" This statement by the
court is inaccurate when examined against the history of the cases.
North Carolina courts had used such language in cases involving other
torts, but had never spoken this way in a case where fraud was the
tort alleged. 6 Indeed, if this proposition were applied to Swinton, that
decision could be read to hold that punitive damages might flow from
a finding of breach + fraud (qua tort) + fraud (qua aggravation), a
reductio ad absurdum of the Swinton analysis. Far from being a "con-
sistent" application of an old rule, the statement in Oestreicher was a
considerable departure from history, or at least from Swinton, which
was the only case in which the question of fraud as the "accompanying
tort" had been considered. The majority did not overrule or even dis-
tinguish Swinton, but here in Oestreicher was the clear suggestion that
the Swinton formulation in requiring an "element of aggravation" when
fraud was the tort had required one element too many. However
wrongly it had read its own precedent, the supreme court seemed to give
notice that henceforth punitive damages would be possible even in a
93. Id. at 431, 66 N.E.2d at 231.
94. 290 N.C. at 135, 225 S.E.2d at 808.
95. Id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 808.
96. See Note, supra note 2, at 475.
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suit for breach of contract when "an element of fraud" was found. Not
"aggravated fraud," but, simply, "fraud." The language of the majority
opinion seemed to offer a new formulation: breach ± fraud (Oestrei-
cher), rather than breach ± fraud + aggravation (Swinton) .97
But if this was the new rule, it was not clearly implemented by
the Oestreicher court. The majority seemed to lean in both directions
on the question of punitive damages. It cannot be said with certainty
that Oestreicher even required a distinct cause of action in tort. The
majority spoke of punitive damages for "breach of contract actions that
smack of tort because of the fraud and deceit involved" and "this type
of contract case with substantial tort overtones emanating from the
fraud and deceit."'98 No two trial judges are likely to agree on the point
at which a breaching party's conduct begins to "smack of tort." On
the other hand, it is difficult to know what to make of the statement
by the Oestreicher majority that "[ilt seems to us that the overall alle.-
gations bring the plaintiff within the rationale of Swinton v. Savoy
Realty Co ..... 99 There is a nagging reference early in the opinion
to the distinction made in Swinton "between aggravated and simple
fraud, with punitive damages allowable in the one case and refused
in the other."'10  The two cases seem irreconcilable-if the swindle
of the aged illiterates in Swinton is not "aggravated," how can an "ele-
ment of aggravation" be found in the facts of Oestreicher?
Oestreicher increased the likelihood that a contracting party who
is a victim of fraud will reach the jury with a claim for punitive dam-
ages. The weakness of the case is that it failed to clear North Carolina
law of the slogans and cluttered tests of the earlier cases. The court
was either careless or purposely vague in its treatment of earlier law,
particularly the Swinton decision. The uselessness of the catch
phrases, introduced in Swinton and reinforced by Oestreicher, is illus-
trated by the fact that neither the majority nor the dissent in Oestreicher
sought to distinguish Swinton. Rather, both used language from the
case in support of their opposing positions. Indeed, a less than
97. Evidence that the court intended to eliminate the "aggravation" requirement
may be found in the court's reliance upon a student note. See 290 N.C. at 136, 225
S.E.2d at 809 (citing Note, supra note 2). That note had criticized the additional re-
quirement and had made policy arguments for the possibility of punitive damages in
the instance of fraudulent breach. The note is the only authority cited for the last
step in reaching the Oestreicher holding.
98. Id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 809.
99. Id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 808.
100. Id. at 133-34, 225 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting Swinton, 236 N.C. at 726, 73 S.E.2d
at 787).
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scrupulous reading of Oestreicher could justify the imposition of any
test from "breach of contract that smacks of tort" through breach +
fraud + aggravation. The majority opinion, rather than broadening the
area within which the trial judge had to permit a jury to determine par-
ticular damages in a civil action, merely expanded the area within which
a judge could, if he wished, send the question to a jury.
Newton reaffirmed the rule that punitive damages could be al-
lowed for an independent tort that accompanies a breach of contract. 1°1
The requirement that the tortious conduct be somehow aggravated was
reiterated. 10 2 The opinion of Justice Exum, however, narrowed drasti-
cally the discretion of the trial judge when that accompanying tort is
fraud:
The aggravated conduct which supports an award for pun-
itive damages when an identifiable tort is alleged may be estab-
lished by allegations of behavior extrinsic to the tort itself, as in
slander cases. . . . Or it may be established by allegations suffi-
cient to allege a tort where that tort, by its very nature, encom-
passes any of the elements of aggravation. Such a tort is fraud,
since fraud is, itself, one of the elements of aggravation which will
permit punitive damages to be awarded ...
• . . Insofar as Swinton v. Realty Co. requires some kind of
aggravated conduct in addition to actionable fraud or makes any
distinction between "simple" and "aggravated" fraud, permitting
punitive damages only for the latter, that case is overruled, as are
all cases so holding.10 3
Justice Exum blamed the result in Swinton upon "a misapprehension
concerning our traditional public policy which supports the doctrine of
punitive damages."104 The rationale for cancelling punitive damages
in Swinton-and one of the arguments in Chief Justice Sharp's dissent
in Oestreicher-was that once the plaintiff had been made whole
within the terms of the contract, there remained no justification for
punitive damages. Justice Exum emphasized that in North Carolina
the policy behind punitive damages was not "to compensate the plaintiff
for non-quantifiable compensatory damages"' but to punish the
defendant and deter others by example. The punishment of "simple"
fraud as an intentional wrongdoing was certainly within this policy.
101. 291 N.C. at 111, 229 S.E.2d at 301.
102. Id. at 112, 229 S.E.2d at 301.
103. Id. at 112-13, 229 S.E.2d at 301-02.
104. Id. at 113, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
105. Id.
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Although it did so in dictum, the Newton majority established
clearly that a trial judge can no longer dismiss a claim for punitive dam-
ages if the plaintiff has alleged the elements of breach + fraud. The
decision was a definite move toward allowing juries to consider directly
the blameworthiness of a breach of contract itself, as a breach and with-
out prior filtering through a mesh of legal standards.
IV. "EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL" DAMAGES
The language of North Carolina cases confirms that the expressed
purpose of punitive damages has been to burden defendant with costs
that exceed plaintiff's losses, thus, by public example, deterring further
such conduct. Yet, there are practical considerations that seem to cut
against Justice Exum's disavowal in Newton of any policy of compensa-
tion in the awarding of punitive damages. The defendant's "bad mind"
might cause an unpleasant mental state that the plaintiff would not have
experienced if the defendant's harmful conduct had been merely care-
less. Mental distress on the part of the plaintiff might be seen as the
other side of the defendant's "intentional wrongdoing" or "malice," so
that punishing the defendant for his mental state might, at the same
time, compensate the plaintiff for his.' It would be difficult to say
that such damages were "punitive" if "punitive" must mean utterly non-
compensatory.
In another sense, plaintiff in Oestreicher, if the jury now decides
to award punitive damages, will have been compensated for having to
bring a lawsuit to recover what was always due her under the contract
and what defendant has intentionally and wrongfully withheld. De-
fendant will have been made to pay plaintiff for the extra effort to
which plaintiff has been put. The "punitive" damages sanctioned in
Oestreicher were not based upon the purely punitive, exemplary, non-
compensatory policies stated by Justice Exum in Newton. By its use
of the term "punitive damages," the Oestreicher majority seemed to
suggest damages that were compensatory but that, at the same time,
were not damages of the sort usually awarded for the non-performance
of contractual obligations. The dual aspect of the "punitive" damages
approved in Oestreicher-punitive and compensatory-reflected three
common-sense equities noted by the majority: (1) there is little deter-
106. See D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.9, at 205. Professor Dobbs notes that some
courts have regarded such damages as compensation for "dignitary invasions," Id.
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rent against fraud in the contractual arrangement if all that the perpe-
trator stands to lose is that which he had promised under the contract
in the first place; (2) compensating plaintiff by reference to the terms
of the contract will not make him entirely whole; and (3) any award
will be lessened by the expenses of litigation.117
Punitive damages, in the sense intended by Justice Exum in
Newton, constitute only one of several classes of special damages gen-
erally denied the plaintiff who asserts rights that are his only by virtue
of a contract. 10 8 The meaning of "compensation" may vary depending
upon whether a plaintiff is suing in contract or in tort. The policy of
compensation in a contract action is, in general terms, to provide the
complaining party with those benefits that would have been his had
the other party performed. 0 In the case of an insurance contract such
as the one in Newton, performance amounts to payment of the amount
of the policy. Newton complained, however, that he had to borrow
money as a result of his inability to collect the $5,500 due him under
the policy and that interest payments on the borrowed money repre-
sented losses that he would not have sustained but for defendant's re-
fusal to make timely payment. In addition, an insured, like Newton,
may be forced to surrender mortgaged property or incur the expenses
of defending against suits brought by creditors, losses that flow from
the breach of the insurance contract but for which the face value of
the policy is inadequate compensation. It has been held generally that
"in the absence of special circumstances in the contemplation of the
parties at the time of the making of the contract," damages for the
failure or delay of an insurer to pay are limited to the amount due under
the policy, with interest."10 Recovery of such consequential damages
requires a showing that the possibility of such damages was "forseen"
by both insurer and insured."' For many of the same reasons, the
107. 290 N.C. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 809.
108. D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 12.3, at 804, 812; J. MCCARTHY, PUNTivE DAM-
AGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 2.2, at 12 (1976). The discussion that follows depends
heavily on McCarthy's analysis of the California bad faith action. McCarthy's book
is cited by both the majority and dissent in Oestreicher, 290 N.C. at 137, 147, 225
S.E.2d at 809, 815, and by the majority in Newton, 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229 S.E.2d
297, 301.
109. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 108, § 2.25, at 79; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 329, Comment a (1932).
110. Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 314, 326 (1973); accord, J. MCCARTHY, supra note 108,
§ 2.2, at 13.
111. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1932); see 3 J. STRoNG, supra note 1,
Contracts § 29.3; Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 314, 326-31 (1973); ci. D. DOBBS, supra note
41, § 12.3 (recognizing but criticizing the framing of the rule in terms of forsecability).
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insured has little hope of recovering damages for mental distress
brought on by the breakdown of his insurance coverage. 1 ' In most
cases, regardless of the cause of action, the prevailing party cannot re-
cover attorney's fees." 3  It is too speculative to say what such special
damages might have been and safer for the jury to stay within the limits
of the contract where presumably the plaintiff, if he was able, bar-
gained any such otherwise "unforeseeable" risks onto the defendant." 4
In contrast, "compensation" of the tort victim is the restoration of the
plaintiff to a position as near as possible to that which he occupied be-
fore the wrong occurred." 5  A successful contract plaintiff is to be
placed where he might have been; a successful tort plaintiff is to be
placed where he was. The jury is not to be trusted to search for dam-
ages in the vague realms of "might have been," but is to be held close
to the terms of the contract. Again, this is the theory. The practical
effect of this dichotomy is that the pleader in tort stands a better chance
of having his consequential economic losses made good, his mental
well-being repaired, and perhaps even his attorney's fees remitted." 6
V. BAD FAITH
In Oestreicher, it was decided that a defendant might be liable
for damages beyond the amount due under the terms of the contract
upon a showing of defendant's intent to deceive and induce reliance
upon his deceit. Oestreicher alleged that defendant had lied to her
and that it was this lie that breached the contract. She asserted that
the lie, in addition to being a breach, was a tort. In assessing damages,
this "tortious breach" can be contrasted to an entirely innocent breach
-a misunderstanding of the scope of the obligation or genuine inability
to perform. In the latter, there is no "culpable mind" at work. What
damages, however, should be visited upon the defendant who has not
112. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 108, § 2.2, at 14; see 5 A. CORBIN, supra note
1, § 1076; D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 12.4, at 819; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTS §
341 (1932).
113. D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.8, at 194; J. McCARTHY, supra note 108, § 2.28,
at 81.
114. Koufos v. Czarnikow, Ltd. (The Heron H), [1969] 1 A.C. 350, 385.
115. J. McCARTHY, supra note 108, § 2.25, at 79; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 901,
Comment a (1939).
116. Attorney's fees are sometimes awarded under the guise of "punitive damages"
so that the plaintiff who is permitted to assert a tort claim is a step ahead toward
these damages as well as the other special damages. D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.8,
at 197.
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induced plaintiff's reliance with a promise that he never intended to
perform (i.e., a lie), but whose failure or refusal to perform is based
nonetheless upon his own interest rather than upon honest mistake or
inability? The state of mind in such a middle ground breach has some-
times been designated bad faith.117
A number of jurisdictions have recognized that a bad faith breach
of an insurance contract may be an appropriate occasion for "extra-
contractual" remedies. The damages that legislatures and courts have
extended to plaintiffs in this situation seem to be found in a gray policy
zone somewhere between compensation of a plaintiff whose suffering
has been particularly burdensome and punishment of an unusually
blameworthy defendant. Georgia, for example, provides by statute
that an insurer who breaches in bad faith his obligation to the insured
is liable for plaintiff's attorney's fees as well as for a "penalty" of up
to twenty-five percent of the insurer's contractual liability. 118  An
Indiana court has imposed punitive damages for "oppressive conduct"
in a case where the insurer refused payment under policy provisions
found by the jury to be "so clear that the insurers could not dispute
the amount of liability in good faith." 1 9  At least a portion of the
"punitive damages" awarded in that case may have been intended by
the court as compensation for financial losses to plaintiff's business that
came as a consequence of defendant's refusal to pay.120 Plaintiffs
suing a breaching insurer in California have recovered "for all detri-
ment proximately resulting" from his conduct,' 2' including economic
117. Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 202 N.C. 604, 607, 163 S.E. 676, 677
(1932).
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1206 (1971) ("Term 'bad faith,' as used in Code § 56-
1206 means any frivolous and unfounded refusal in law or in fact to comply with de-
mand of policy holder to pay according to terms of policy." Royal Ins. Co. v. Cohen,
105 Ga. App. 746, 747, 125 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1962)); cf. MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§§ 40-2617, -4011, -4034 (1961) (Statute provides for fine or imprisonment for delay
in payment of insurance proceeds upon written proof of loss. Punitive damages have
been awarded under this statute where the insurer's failure to pay promptly was found
to be oppressive, malicious or fraudulent. State ex rel. Larson v. District Court, 149
Mont. 131, 423 P.2d 598 (1967)).
119. Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, - Ind. App. -, 316 N.E.2d 381, 384
(1974). An Ohio court has held that an insurer must act in good faith to protect
the interests of its insured. Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d
919 (Franklin County C.P. 1970). Punitive damages were awarded when the court
found defendant insurer's refusal to pay to be such "a breach of contract amounting
to a wilful, wanton and malicious tort." Id. at -, 273 N.E.2d at 921.
120. - Ind. App. -, -, 316 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1974).
121. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal, App. 3d 376, 401-02, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 93-94 (1970).
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loss,12 2 emotional distress' 23 and attorney's fees,' as well as punitive
damages.12 5
Legislatures and courts have rested these results on the nature of
the insurance contract. 12 6 It has been noted that bargaining power be-
tween insurer and insured is vastly out of balance: 27 often, the would-
be insured has been handed a ream of "fine print" documentation on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis. To the extent that he has bargained at all,
however, the policyholder has bargained for the exact financial security
and peace of mind that the insurer's breach will deny him. 28  Loss
of this peace of mind is clearly within the contemplation of both parties
at the time the insurance policy is signed.
The rule denying damages for emotional distress brought on by
a breach has been excepted to when defendant has breached an agree-
ment that had "personal rather than pecuniary purposes in view."1 9
In California, at least, the insurance contract has been classified as such
a "personal contract." 30 In his agreement with the insurance com-
pany, the insured has sought no commercial advantage. Further, the
very purpose of insurance coverage is to provide for unpredictable risks,
that is, those economic losses that might have resulted if plaintiff had
not secured insurance. It could be argued that the losses that have
now resulted as a consequence of the insurer's refusal to pay are the
very losses that were contemplated by the contracting parties.
122. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (loss of business); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,
510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973) (loss of earnings from business; costs of
defense of lawsuits brought by creditors); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10
Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (loss of investment property).
123. See cases cited note 122 supra.
124. See Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr.
581 (1975). See also McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D.
Cal. 1975).
125. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (dictum); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.
3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
126. J. McCARTHY, supra note 108, § 1.1, at 2-3, § 2.1, at 8-9.
127. Id. § 2.20, at 62.
128. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 19 (1967). See also D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 12.4, at 820 n.22.
129. D. DoBBs, supra note 41, § 12.4, at 819; see, e.g., Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal.
2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948) (contract to bury a family member); Mitchell v. Shreve-
port Laundries, Inc., 61 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 1952) (contract to launder wedding gar-
ments in time for the ceremony); 11 C.J.S. Breach of Marriage Promise § 40(b), at
809 n.65 (1938 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
130. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); J. McCAxRTmY, supra note 108, § 2.4, at 18.
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The California Supreme Court has avoided the difficulties of this
"contemplation" question by its willingness to imply a "covenant of
good faith and fair dealing"'' between the insurance company and the
policy holder-a covenant that the insurer "will do nothing to deprive
the insured of the benefits of the policy."1' 3 2 Through a line of deci-
sions of that court since 1958, that personal covenant has been general-
ized into a duty-wholly apart from the obligations under the contract
-of good faith treatment of the insured's interests. In Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co., a3 the court described this duty:
It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under which
the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its
contractual responsibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal
fairly and in good faith with its insured by refusing, without proper
cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy,
such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.13 4
Furthermore, good faith on the part of the insurer required that any
ambiguity in the policy be resolved in favor of the insured. 35 In Cali-
fornia, then, bad faith on the part of an insurer gives rise to a claim
for relief sounding in tort capable of bringing in damages-economic
loss, mental distress, attorney's fees and punitive damages-normally
beyond the reach of a plaintiff whose contract rights have been violated.
The Newton majority acknowledged the special nature of insur-
ance contracts:
[B]ecause of the great disparity of financial resources which gen-
erally exists between insurer and insured and the fact that insur-
131. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 16 (1967). The same or similar language is used by the California Supreme
Court in Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110,
113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 (1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573,
510 P.2d 1032, 1036-37, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484-85 (1973); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970).
132. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 93 (1970). The covenant has been described elsewhere as "'an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing . . . that neither party will do anything which will
injure the rights of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.'" Gruenberg
v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032, 1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484
(1973) (quoting Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d
198, 200 (1958)).
133. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
134. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485. The case also described
the conduct that breached the tort duty as an "unreasonable withholding" of insurance
proceeds. Id. In another case, the tort duty was held to be breached by an "unwar-
ranted refusal to pay." Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d
173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
135, 1. McCARTHY, supra note 108, § 2.20, at 66.
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ance companies, like common carriers and utilities, are regulated
and clearly affected with a public interest, we recognize the
wisdom of a rule which would deter refusals on the part of
insurers to pay valid claims when the refusals are both unjustified
and in bad faith.' 30
In his complaint, Newton had alleged "the failure and refusal of
defendant to properly settle and pay plaintiff" the insurance proceeds
"to which he was entitled." He further alleged that the insurer's
awareness of plaintiff's "desperate need" for the insurance proceeds
without which he could no longer "effectively carry on his business"
made defendant's refusal to perform "heedless, wanton and oppres-
sive.' 37  In his appellate brief, Newton had cited to the supreme court
the California cases that had established the implied-in-law duty of
good faith. Newton urged that the insurance company's "unjustified
failure to pay"'38 amounted to "oppressive conduct constituting a
tort."'39 Such conduct should give rise to liability for punitive damages,
the appellant argued. Beyond that, he asked that the North Carolina
Supreme Court declare "a rule . . . permitting recovery of all proxi-
mately caused detriment in a single cause of action."' 40
The issue directly before the court was whether punitive damages
could be awarded for the insurer's bad faith. Implicit in that inquiry
was the question of the validity of bad faith as a tort cause of action.
The two questions were not co-extensive. A denial of punitive dam-
ages did not have to be a denial of Newton's ability to claim in tort.
Short of punitive damages, a bad faith claim had the potential for gener-
ating "extra-contractual" recovery of economic losses, damages for
mental distress and attorney's fees. The court need not have limited
itself to the stark choice between punitive damages at one end of the
spectrum and the contractual remedy at the other. The complaint al-
leged financing arrangements with creditors under which interest
136. 291 N.C. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 303. It is worth noting here that the North
Carolina Supreme Court has imposed a tort duty upon one party to a contract in the
case of a banker who has wrongfully refused to pay on a depositor's check. The possi-
bility of punitive damages was acknowledged. Woody v. First Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C.
549, 552, 140 S.E. 150, 152 (1927). The same policies applied by Justice Exum in
Newton to insurers, public utilities and conveyancers were noted with regard to banks
in Woody. Id. at 555, 140 S.E. at 154. The analogy between banks and insurers seems
to be a sound one.
137. 291 N.C. at 110-11, 229 S.E.2d at 300.
138. Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 4, 27 N.C. App. 168, 218 S.E.2d 231 (1975)
(quoting G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsURANCE LAw, § 58.9, at 13 (2d ed. 1966)).
139. Id. at 3.
140. Id. at 14 (quoting Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 94 (1970)).
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charges were mounting as long as Newton's insurance claim remained
unpaid. These were damages recoverable under a tort theory. De-
nied punitive damages in the strict sense, Newton might also have
sought damages for mental distress occasioned by the company's refusal
to pay and the consequent economic burden. In Oestreicher, the
majority had stated that one of the purposes of what it called "punitive"
damages was to provide some recompense for the plaintiff who had in-
curred legal expenses in the course of vindicating a contract right with
which the defendant had wrongfully interfered. 141 The relationship of
trust between the parties to an insurance contract and the nearly help-
less position of the insured at the time when he most needs help pro-
vide even stronger arguments for the awarding of attorney's fees in the
case of an insurer's interference with its policyholder's rightful re-
covery. The policies outlined in Oestreicher as well as the doctrinal
clarity insisted upon in Newton would have been well met by the array
of compensations available to the plaintiff who proves bad faith. In-
deed, the majority in Newton clearly acknowledged these other "extra-
contractual" remedies, although the idea was not fully developed. In
exploring the concept of bad faith, Justice Exum went beyond the
category of punitive damages and spoke more generally of "allowing
tort damages in insurance cases."'1 42 The first California case cited by the
court is not a punitive damages case at all, but a case in which an in-
sured was awarded damages for mental distress suffered as a result of
her insurer's bad faith refusal to settle a claim.143
In Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co., 4 4 the California
Supreme Court had noted the distinction between punitive and other
"extra-contractual" damages:
It does not follow that because plaintiff is entitled to com-
pensatory damages [for a bad faith claim] that he is also entitled
to exemplary damages. In order to justify an award of exemplary
damages, the defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or
malice. He must act with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or
with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights. While we
have concluded that defendant violated its duty of good faith
and fair dealing, this alone does not necessarily establish that de-
fendant acted with the requisite intent to injure plaintiff. 14r
141. 290 N.C. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 806.
142. 291 N.C. at 115, 229 S.E.2d at 303 (emphasis added).
143. Id. (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967)).
144. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
145. Id. at 462-63, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718,
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In effect, California had required the familiar "element of aggra-
vation." The pleader who sought punitive damages for insurer's bad
faith must allege: breach + independent tort (bad faith) + aggravation
("oppression, fraud or malice"). The Newton court could have de-
cided the only issue before it by stating simply that it had failed to find
the requisite aggravation. Conversely, the California court had made
it clear that a showing of aggravation was not prerequisite to recovery
of other special damages. 4" Even after disarming Newton of his puni-
tive damages claim, the court remained in a position to equip him with
a tort cause of action.
Newton was sent back to the trial court with only his contract rights
intact. The court went further than was necessary to decide the puni-
tive damages question and held that "the allegations in the complaint
of oppressive behavior by defendant in breaching the contract are insuf-
ficient to plead any recognizable tort."14 At the same time, however,
Justice Exum held out hope that a cause of action in tort for bad faith
would be upheld if the necessary elements were before the court . 48
Justice Exum looked to the California rulings for their definition
of bad faith. The California plaintiff need show only that defendant
insurer lacked a reasonable justification for his refusal to pay. In
Silberg, for example, the insurer defended on the ground that it had
reasonably withheld payments while awaiting the outcome of a work-
men's compensation proceeding that could have compensated plaintiff
fully. The California Supreme Court held that defendant should have
paid the insured the full amount of the policy and attached a lien to
any future workmen's compensation recovery. Defendant's stance in
waiting two years to see if it would be required to perform was held to
"deprive the insured of the benefits of the policy." Despite the possi-
bility that by the strict terms of the insurance agreement defendant
146. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1973).
147. 291 N.C. at 114, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
148. "We need not now decide whether a bad faith refusal to pay a justifiable claim
by an insurer might give rise to punitive damages." Id. at 115, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
The question had been raised earlier in King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273
N.C. 396, 159 S.E.2d 891 (1968), where plaintiff insured sought punitive damages, al-
leging that defendant insurer had exercised bad faith in its refusal, first, to defend in-
sured against a counterclaim and, second, to pay the counterclaim when insured lost
at trial. The supreme court held that "there is no allegation of facts giving rise to
a right of action for deceit or any other tort" and, therefore, limited plaintiff to his
remedies under the contract. Id. at 398, 159 S.E.2d at 893. In Newton, Justice Exum
distinguished King as a case in which the allegation of bad faith was unsupported by
facts as a matter of law. 291 N.C. at 115, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
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might never have been compelled to pay, his conduct was held to be
unreasonable. 49
Newton alleged an "unjustified failure to pay."' 0  The Newton
majority responded: "Insurer's knowledge that plaintiff was in a pre-
carious financial position in view of his loss does not in itself show bad
faith on the part of the insurer in refusing to pay the claim, or for that
matter, that the refusal was unjustified."'' 1 If Newton did not mean
to approve the California definition of bad faith, the North Carolina
court made extensive use of the term without providing a definition
of its own. The majority gave only one indication that it might have
had in mind something other than the California definition:
Had plaintiff claimed that after due investigation by defendant it
was determined that the claim was valid and defendant neverthe-
less refused to pay or that defendant refused to make any investi-
gation at all, and that defendant's refusals were in bad faith with
an intent to cause further damage to plaintiff, a different question
would be presented.' 5 2
But which question: the question of whether a bad faith claim
had been stated, or whether punitive damages could be awarded in ad-
dition to other damages available for that claim? If Newton established
that allegations of either (1) investigation + valid claim + refusal to
pay, or (2) no investigation + refusal to pay are sufficient to state a
valid bad faith claim, but that for punitive damages one needs the addi-
tional allegation of "intent to cause further damage to plaintiff," then
the court was correct in upholding the denial of punitive damages. The
majority, however, may have been inconsistent with its own guidelines
in holding that "this case involves no tort."' 5 3 In complaining of an
"unjustified failure to pay" and "a refusal to properly settle," 5 4 Newton
was saying, at least implicitly, that Standard had investigated his claim
-in the year since the burglary-had found it valid and still refused
to make good the claim.
Admittedly, Newton had not alleged the insurer's intent to cause
him further damage, but that "element of aggravation" is essential only
to the punitive damages claim and not to the bad faith cause of action
itself. The court does not suggest what damages might be available
149. 11 Cal. 3d at 457, 521 P.2d at 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
150. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
151. 291 N.C. at 115, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
152. Id. at 115-16, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
153. Id. at 114, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
154. See text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
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to plaintiff if the insurer had breached "with a conscious disregard of
the plaintiff's rights" without the insurer's specific intent to injure plain-
tiff, the more likely case between a large foreign insurance company
and a relatively anonymous policyholder. How the insured would go
about proving the company's actual intent to harm him remains a
mystery, unless the insurer could be held to have intended the probable
consequences of his refusal to comply with the contract.
VI. CONCLUSION
While questions remain unanswered, some relatively certain
assessments of the two cases can be made. In Oestreicher, the North
Carolina Supreme Court relaxed its "aggravation" standard for punitive
damages recovery by a party complaining of a fraudulent breach of con-
tract. At the same time it expressed a pragmatic concern for various
expenses to plaintiff resulting from such a wrongful breach. The for-
mula breach + fraud (as accompanying tort + inherent element of
aggravation) = punitive damages is clearly accepted. In Newton the
court suggested the possibility of an action for an insurer's breach of
an implied tort duty of good faith dealing. Acceptance of this tort duty
into North Carolina law would give a complaining policyholder an
avenue to punitive damages if he can plead and prove breach + bad
faith (as accompanying tort) + aggravation. Further, the ability to pro-
ceed under a theory of breach of a tort duty of good faith may enable
recovery of special damages heretofore not available in North Carolina
for breach of contract, even an insurance contract.
If a plaintiff in a North Carolina court can recover economic losses
that were a consequence of an insurance company's unreasonable
failure to honor its contractual obligations to him-damages for
emotional distress resulting from this failure, and the attorney's fees
expended in redressing it-whether these recoveries are characterized
as "punitive" or as new forms of compensatory damages, the plaintiff
has gained considerable ground. Perhaps even more significant is the
fact that in these two holdings, the North Carolina court has rebalanced
the relationship between trial judge and jury, restricting the judge's dis-
cretion to deny certain damage claims and granting the jury new
freedom in the design of a remedy.
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